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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of
the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD￿s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF￿s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.COUNTRY OWNERSHIP OF REFORM PROGRAMMES
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Abstract
The essence of ownership is the acceptance of full responsibility for the
consequences of a programme. Ownership matters because of the expectation
that programme design will be more appropriate and country authorities will
be resolute in taking steps domestically to ensure full implementation of the
programme. The steps include seeking proper domestic legitimation, which will
prevent certain ￿political economy￿ factors from disrupting programme
implementation. That programme success is correlated with degree of ownership
and that ownership is correlated with implementation, which in turn is correlated
with programme legitimation, are supported by available evidence. Ex ante
selectivity is easily made preferable to ex post, and for financial support a
recipient country must satisfy the donor country or organization team as to the
reality of ownership, soundness of the programme (policies and outcomes), and
adequate implementation capacity. From a positive perspective, forces operating
on both the demand and supply side of aid should inevitably bring about a new
equilibrium regime in the aid relationship that excludes traditional condi-
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As part of reform programmes (or in the event
of sudden financial crises), many low- and middle-
income countries seek financial assistance from
multilateral organizations of which they are mem-
bers as well as from governments of industrial
countries. There are, no doubt, a complex set of rea-
sons why countries do so rather than simply run to
private markets. Such reasons include some or all of
the following expectations: short delay before the
funds are received; lower interest rates for given
amounts than in private markets; some catalytic ef-
fect on private markets and hence positive effects
on capital inflows; and flexibility in obtaining addi-
tional resources from the same source in case of
unforeseen difficulties during the implementation of
the reform.1 Our interest is in situations where the
multilaterals and the bilaterals are willing to give
such assistance as a signal of their support for the
reform efforts of the countries, rather than for purely
political or humanitarian reasons. In this regard,
Alessina and Dollar (2000), for instance, find evi-
dence that political factors, such as colonial ties and
preservation of friendship (as evidenced by the
United Nations voting records), drive much of nor-
mal bilateral aid, although for some aid donors
(notably the Nordic countries and the United States)
the poverty of the recipient is an important deter-
mining factor as well. In other words, bilateral aid
flows are not systematically related to the economic
policies of the recipient countries (Burnside and
Dollar, 2000).
Many reform programmes (structural, stabili-
zation, major sectoral projects) do not seem to
achieve their objectives and many observers believe
that, among other consequences, world public re-
sources have been wasted by the donors on some of
the recipient countries. The reasons for the undera-
chievement (failures) are, as a first approximation,
typically distributed between those due to exogenous
factors outside the control of the country authorities
and those due to failures of the authorities. The lat-
ter set are of particular interest for obvious reasons.
Failure due to factors under the control of the au-
thorities have been attributed to poor programme
design but mainly to inadequate implementation.
Design failures could ensue from inadequacies of
theory or simply misguided application of theory.
Failures in implementation result from lack of politi-
cal will of the authorities or simply from inadequate
capacity. Many analysts have come to believe that
such unavoidable failures in programme design and
implementation are ultimately due to what has been
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loosely termed lack of country ￿ownership￿ of pro-
grammes. The idea is that financial constraints impel
countries to seek assistance from international or-
ganizations and major bilateral donors and these aid
givers and creditors impose policy ￿conditionalities￿
that drive the programmes. Given the process of
negotiating the programmes in practice, the reform-
ing (recipient) countries are left to implement
programmes over which they feel little if any own-
ership, typically because of the submissive role they
play at the design stage. Defenders of policy condi-
tionality, nevertheless, see it as a way to deal with
the risk of policy reversals, which in the case of loans
helps to safeguard the resources and in the case of
unrequited transfers ensures that those resources do
not go to waste.
In this paper, we argue that if the policies vol-
untarily adopted by a country are sound and if those
policies are expected to be fully implemented and
sustained ￿ barring certain unforeseen exogenous
developments ￿ then traditional (policy-based)
conditionality is not necessary for timely repayment
of the money borrowed from the IMF, the World
Bank, or any other creditor. Country ownership of a
programme could be used as the ￿instrument￿ to
address policy implementation (including policy
sustainability), and the IMF and the World Bank (or
donor) efforts could be tailored mainly to address
the soundness (and sustainability) of policies. The
correctness of this proposition would be assured if
there are explicit and transparent rules that are en-
forced relating to: (i) limitations on continuous use
of the international organization￿s or donor￿s re-
sources, and (ii) punishment for default in making
timely repayment of debt to the international organi-
zation or donor (as relevant). We discuss a number
of suggested approaches to reforming conditionality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section argues that the essence of owner-
ship is the acceptance of full responsibility for the
consequences of a programme, that ownership gives
a country the right to insist on making the final de-
cisions, without coercion, on the contents of a pro-
gramme, and that acceptance by a country of
responsibility for a programme must be credibly
demonstrated. This is followed by a section on owner-
ship and programming, which argues that ownership
matters because of the expectation that programme
design will be superior and that the country authori-
ties will be resolute in taking the appropriate steps,
especially domestic legitimation, to ensure full im-
plementation of the programme. It also argues that
programme success is correlated with degree of
ownership, which in turn is correlated with pro-
gramme legitimation. The section following dis-
cusses the rationale for policy-based conditionality
and the criticisms levied against it, in particular, that
it has not succeeded in bringing good policy envi-
ronments in aid-recipient countries.
Then the paper turns to a discussion of selec-
tivity as a device for allocating aid resources,
founded on four principles, namely, ownership, se-
lectivity, support, and dialogue. We distinguish ex
post from ex ante selectivity, present the case for ex
post selectivity, which is currently fashionable
among many analysts in the policy community, but
then argue in favour of ex ante selectivity. Then the
paper addresses the issue of operationalizing condi-
tionality under ex ante selectivity. It pursues the
argument that agreeing conditionality in this frame-
work would entail establishing existence of ownership,
soundness of the programme (policies and out-
comes), and adequate implementation capacity. The
penultimate section argues that, if the approach (re-
garding rules and organizational arrangements)
outlined in the paper, is adhered to, there would be
self-interest in the recipient countries in implement-
ing and sustaining sound policies and there would
be self-interest within the aid-giving organizations
to insist on sound policies and satisfactory outcomes
as a condition for future aid. The final section con-
cludes, arguing from a positive perspective that the
elimination of traditional conditionality in the con-
text of country ownership of reform programmes
may be inevitable in the near future.
II. Essence of ownership
Johnson and Wasty (1993: 2) note, quite rightly,
that ￿it is seldom made clear as to what constitutes
adequate ownership ...￿. They also remark that ￿the
relationship between  program success and owner-
ship can be prone to a post hoc ergo procter hoc
type circularity in argument: if the  program suc-
ceeds, then there was ownership, and if it falters,
then ownership was absent￿. In the context of World
Bank supported programmes, Johnson and Wasty
(1993) use a four dimensional variable to reflect ￿the
intensity of ownership￿. The first dimension is the
￿locus of initiative￿: namely, who had the initiative
in formulating and implementing the programme,3 Country Ownership of Reform Programmes and the Implications for Conditionality
the degree of collaboration in working out the pro-
gramme, and whether or not the funding for the
programme was extended despite certain reserva-
tions of the authorities (disagreements and reluctance
to implement some aspects of the programme). The
second dimension is the ￿level of intellectual con-
viction among key policymakers￿: namely, the
degree to which there was consensus among policy-
makers on the nature and causes of the problem, the
choices open for its resolution, and the approach to
be taken. The third dimension is the ￿expression of
political will by top leadership￿: as reflected, for
example, in ￿up-front actions￿ and public statements.
The fourth dimension comprises ￿efforts toward
consensus-building among constituencies￿, for
instance, by eliciting broad participation in the
programme design and in launching a ￿broad-based
public campaign￿ to elicit support for the programme
outside the central government.
Killick et al. (1998: 87) have put forward the
following definition of government ownership,
Government ownership is at its strongest when
the political leadership and its advisers, with
broad support among agencies of state and
civil society, decide of their own volition that
policy changes are desirable, choose what
these changes should be and when they should
be introduced, and where these changes be-
come built into parameters of policy and ad-
ministration which are generally accepted as
desirable.
We shall focus on country ownership, rather
than simply government ownership, as the more
complete form of ownership and the one which, in
our view, is desirable for ensuring smooth imple-
mentation of a programme. ￿Ownership￿ from the
perspective of the typical citizen, we believe, is more
about (i) the right of the country representatives to
be heard in the process of diagnosis and programme
design, and (ii) the freedom and ability of the coun-
try to choose the programme to be implemented,
without coercion, than about (iii) who designs the
programme. Of course, many among the educated
elites in civil societies in ￿aid￿ recipient countries
would prefer that their nationals design the pro-
grammes, if they have the requisite technical skills;
they would also want, over time, their own nation-
als to be fully equipped to design every programme.
In the short term to medium term, however, these
same elites will not typically insist on a programme
being designed by local persons for the programme
to be deemed locally owned. Hence, there is no nec-
essary correlation between the degree of active
country participation in the programme design (rela-
tive to participation of outsiders) and the extent or
degree of country ownership. In brief, the line of
causation runs from country ownership (ex ante) to
participation in design and finally to implementation.
Broadly speaking, we shall say that country
ownership exists when there is general belief by citi-
zens of the country as well as by noncitizens that
the country representatives freely chose the pro-
gramme to be implemented, and when there is at the
same time general acceptance of the citizens of the
country of full responsibility for the outcome of the
programme chosen. When a country ￿owns￿ a pro-
gramme it willingly accepts the costs of any failure.
A country with a rational decision making process
will then act consistently with this belief and accept-
ance of responsibility. A rational decision making
process is one that is generally expected to result in
a programme that is in the best interest of the citi-
zens of the country as a whole; in other words, an
expected outcome of such a process is a programme
that maximizes the expected utility of the citizens,
subject to unavoidable economic and other con-
straints.
A. Ownership right and obligation
The essential content of a reform programme
is a set of targets and instruments and the imple-
mentation arrangements. If a country owns a
programme, it has the right to insist on making the
final decisions without coercion on the contents of a
programme. In addition, the country accepts with-
out coercion the obligation to take full responsibility
for the outcome of the programme and hence for the
welfare consequences to its citizens and for certain
external effects on noncitizens. Furthermore, the
above right and obligation would be generally ac-
knowledged by all other parties such as creditors,
international organizations, and other countries who
have anything to do with the programme.
A country with the above ownership right and
obligation, which are fully acknowledged by out-
siders, will try to design and implement a programme
that it envisages to be in its interest. Since the con-
tents of the programme may have repercussions for
other countries and ￿foreign￿ organizations, the re-
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to modify its programme￿s contents. In other words,
in exercising its generally acknowledged right and
obligation to design and implement its programme,
a country will be constrained by the interests, and
hence behaviour, of others affected by the programme.
The inevitability of constraints to freedom of
choice in exercising ownership right makes it nec-
essary to clarify what one might call the ￿ultimate
defining quality￿ of country ownership. For the con-
straints imply that a country hardly ever acts as it
would ￿ideally￿ want to do under complete liberty.
They also imply that it generally would be difficult
to estimate the degree of freedom with which deci-
sions were taken by the country on the contents of
the programme. In other words, the existence of con-
straints on the freedom to choose cannot be used to
support an absence of ownership; indeed the impact
of constraints on choice cannot be easily estimated.
We also cannot easily assess the extent of own-
ership by looking at the choices made, except perhaps
for those rare occasions when one is able to observe
all the steps in the decision making on a country
programme right from its initial conception. Nor can
we look at whether the programme was implemented
or not, since there is no necessary perfect correla-
tion between ￿degree of ownership￿ however defined
and degree of implementation.
In the final analysis, then, we would posit that
the defining quality of ownership is a country￿s ac-
ceptance without coercion of full responsibility for
the outcome of a programme and therefore ration-
ally insisting on acting in self-interest to maximize
the expected utility of its citizens obtained from the
programme, in the face of the constraints it faces.
This acceptance of responsibility would be demon-
strated by certain signals and efforts in support of
the programme ￿ before, during, and after imple-
mentation of the programme. The acceptance would
lead the country to take certain initiatives and ac-
tions to further its wishes and protect its interests
during the design and implementation of the pro-
gramme. The initiatives and actions reflect rather
than determine ownership.
B. Policy consistency
A programme that is owned would tend to be
consistent with the general economic framework
from which flow government policy of the country.
In other words, although ￿expressions of political
support￿ may be useful in assessing ownership and
hence commitment to a programme, the expressions
must be credible. Ex ante, such credibility would be
enhanced by looking at a country￿s policies in the
recent past and by looking at current policies out-
side the framework of the programme, when the pro-
gramme is not comprehensive. When the programme
implies major changes in economic framework of
the government/country, then the country can use
credible signals to demonstrate its belief that it owns
the programme. One such signal is, of course, ac-
tive participation in the programme design.
C. Country representatives
In the context of country ownership of a re-
form programme, we would argue that acceptance
by a country of responsibility for a programme must
be credibly demonstrated. Thus, the question arises
as to how a country as a whole demonstrates accept-
ance of responsibility for a programme, since,
typically, the government in power has the respon-
sibility for the design and implementation of a
programme. Ideally, then, there is a strong case for
having the citizens as a group demonstrate accept-
ance of responsibility for the programme of the
government. This could be done directly, e.g., via a
referendum, or indirectly via the people￿s representa-
tives in the parliament. In principle, this direct or
indirect demonstration of acceptance of responsibil-
ity by the people must be without coercion: hence,
there must be some minimum democratic rights of
the people.
III. Ownership and programming
Not surprisingly, available evidence indicates
that success of IMF-supported programmes, in
achieving their objectives, depends on their being
resolutely implemented. Several objectives (inter-
mediate or final), including increased investment and
economic growth, can suffer initial setbacks during
implementation; hence determined pursuit of poli-
cies with no serious policy reversal is important. The
general view among those who have discussed re-
form programmes and their implementation, or
success in general in attaining their objectives, is
that if a country ￿owns￿ a programme, it￿s commit-
ment to implementation is stronger (Johnson and5 Country Ownership of Reform Programmes and the Implications for Conditionality
Wasty, 1993; Killick, 1997; Killick et al., 1998; and
Tsikata, 2003). In addition, many have underscored
that with ownership the programme may be better
in the sense of being more realistic in its objectives
and in using instruments that could more assuredly
attain the objectives. For both reasons, programme
success is expected to be correlated with degree of
ownership.
Johnson and Wasty (1993), in their statistical
analysis of 81 World Bank policy-based lending
operations during the period 1980 to 1988, in 38 coun-
tries, found ￿a significant degree of positive corre-
lation between  program success and borrower
ownership￿. Programme success is as classified by
the Bank￿s Operation Evaluation Department: namely,
each programme￿s outcome is classified as highly
satisfactory, satisfactory, unsatisfactory, or very un-
satisfactory.
Killick and his collaborators (1998: 90) stated
that in eighteen of twenty-one countries studied, ￿the
extent of ownership, or its absence, was found to
have exerted a decisive influence on the degree of
program implementation￿. They argue (p. 98) that
￿ownership has strong explanatory power because
it is a proxy indicator of the extent to which the policy
reforms in question are perceived by those who must
execute them as being in their own, and their com-
patriots￿ interests￿. In this context, they underscore
(p. 98) that ￿the objectives and interests of donor
agencies and of recipient governments can rarely be
expected to coincide￿.
Putting it somewhat differently, then, owner-
ship matters because country authorities are expected
to be resolute in taking the appropriate steps domes-
tically to ensure full implementation. From our per-
spective, the most important steps are seeking proper
domestic legitimation for the programme and estab-
lishing appropriate institutional and organizational
arrangements for effective monitoring of develop-
ments and full implementation even in the presence
of serious and adverse unforeseen developments.
A. Political legitimacy
Legitimation will prevent certain ￿political
economy￿ factors from disrupting programme im-
plementation. Ivanova et al. (2003) in an econometric
study of the factors explaining implementation of
IMF-supported  programmes found that ￿political
economy￿ factors were the primary explananda.
Other possible factors, a priori, namely, the effort
of the IMF, the extent and structure of conditionality,
and the initial and external conditions, did not ￿ma-
terially influence￿ implementation. Here the authors
constructed three variables to gauge IMF support:
(1) IMF effort, measured as the dollar costs of staff
time allocated to a programme; (2) number of IMF
staff missions involved; and (3) the number of mis-
sion days. As they put it (Ivanova et al.: 28): ￿strong
vested interests in parliament, lack of political co-
hesion, poor quality of bureaucracy, and ethnic
divisions significantly undermine  program imple-
mentation￿. For instance, although they caution
drawing definitive conclusions from their study, they
do find that ￿[f]or a country that enjoys perfect po-
litical stability and no special interests in parliament,
the probability of  program implementation is very
high (96 per cent)￿.
Mecagni (1999) also found that some 20 per
cent (10) of 51 interruptions experienced in the im-
plementation of programmes with 36 countries
supported by the SAF/ESAF facilities of the IMF,
during 1986￿1994, were due to ￿political interrup-
tions serious enough to call into question the
continuing authority of the government and, there-
fore, to prevent meaningful negotiations ...￿ (p. 220).
￿Political events￿ also played a role in the vast ma-
jority of the remaining interruptions ￿although not
as disruptively as in the 10 episodes where they were
the overriding factor￿ (Mecagni, 1999: 221). Pro-
gramme interruptions were defined ￿as either an
interval of more than six months between different
annual or multiyear IMF arrangements or a delay of
more than six months in completing a program re-
view￿ (Mecagni, 1999: 217).
Dollar and Svensson (2000) found that success
in structural adjustment programmes of the World
Bank are mainly explained by political economy
factors. In particular, success is associated with
democratically elected governments and with politi-
cal stability. High degrees of ethnic fractionalization
and long-term incumbency of regimes are associ-
ated with failures, after controlling for other factors.
Some donor (World Bank) effort variables (notably
preparation and supervision staff time) are highly
correlated with the probability of success. But the
variables are endogenous, and once the endogeneity
is taken into account, the authors find no correlation
between any of them and the success or failure of
reform programmes.6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 35
Johnson (1994) has, indeed, argued that: ￿for
effective implementation of adjustment  programs it
is necessary for the governments to have the legiti-
mate authority to implement the  programs￿. Without
such authority, ￿a government will not be able to
galvanize the support, and hence cooperation, of the
people ...￿. When it does not have legitimate author-
ity to implement a programme, ￿a government may
find that dependence on other forms of power (force,
manipulation, persuasion) or of authority (coercion)
will enable it to attain only a rather modest degree
of implementation in the face of sabotage, indiffer-
ence, nonparticipation, and minimum effort and
compliance from the general population, despite
large expenditure of resources￿.
Governments often start with a legitimation
deficit for a programme and fail to take appropriate
steps to remove the deficit. Hence, Johnson (1994: 406)
states,
To guarantee virtually full implementation of
a reform program, the program designer must
ensure that the government and its  program
managers have the authority to implement the
program. When such authority seems absent
or when there is sufficient doubt that the gov-
ernment has the authority, the  program de-
signer should advise that the government ob-
tain the authority to implement the program;
otherwise, the program designer cannot be
assured that the program can be carried out.
Country ownership and legitimation of a pro-
gramme will, thus, be positively correlated. Johnson
and Wasty (1993: 7) state that ￿the following appear
to be commonly associated with borrower owner-
ship of the  program: (a) political stability; (b) support
of (or lack of opposition from) various constituen-
cies; and (c) to a somewhat lesser extent, precon-
ceived official attitudes toward or against certain
kinds of reform￿. In this regard, political stability is
not necessarily related to the political regime, and,
indeed, as Johnson and Wasty (1993: 10) note, ￿there
is no systematic evidence that a specific regime type
intrinsically exhibits a greater degree of political will
in support of reform￿. Support (or lack of opposition)
from ￿pressure groups towards their government￿s
pursuit of reforms￿ was ￿[p]erhaps the single most
significant factor in government￿s ownership of the
reform  program￿ (Johnson and Wasty, 1993: 8).
The evidence of legitimation is ultimately citi-
zens￿ consent without coercion, which comes via
several processes ￿ open discussion and delibera-
tion, voting, and overwhelming demonstration of
support (rather than a narrow majority) in Parliament,
in the newspapers, and in civil society voluntary
organizations. In this context, of major importance
is institutionalizing a process of transparency and
public deliberation.2 Public debate would foster dis-
cussion of policy alternatives, including the short-
term and long-term costs. Such discussion would also
motivate genuine search for compromises among
interest groups. Best of all, public debate would fa-
cilitate better appreciation by ordinary citizens of
how the economy works and how good and bad eco-
nomic developments arise. This would help in many
ways, especially curbing unreasonable budgetary
demands and enabling greater understanding of the
value of organization, saving, and efficiency of in-
vestment.
In today￿s world, a search for evidence of le-
gitimation would therefore look for signs of free and
open public debate, parliamentary deliberation and
voting, and referenda. If the need for ownership is
to prevent policy reversal then the legitimation must
probably entail more than simply majority approval
and rather approach consensus. That is, where deci-
sions are taken by voting, super-majorities may be
preferred to achieve a degree of legitimation which
virtually ensures that there would be no policy re-
versal during implementation.
B. Participation and programme
legitimation
When open deliberation of economic policy is
not institutionalized in a country, programme legiti-
mation can still be attained by encouraging broad
participation of various interest groups and indi-
viduals in the design and implementation of the
programme. Indeed, this is one of the rational steps
taken by a government that wants to ensure country
ownership of a programme, irrespective of the ac-
tual or perceived legitimacy of the government.
Typically, in such a situation, the government is anx-
ious to assume ownership of the programme and uses
broad participation of the citizens as a mobilizing
tool to muster support, ￿educate￿ citizens and en-
sure country ownership. Although this is always a
rational step to take, it is even more so when the
government has doubts about its own political le-
gitimacy and hence cannot afford to introduce a7 Country Ownership of Reform Programmes and the Implications for Conditionality
reform programme without broad-based support of
citizens. In such a case, a government is perhaps not
only concerned with preventing policy reversal but
also with its own survival.
The description by Obeng (1996) of the case
of Ghana and its Structural Adjustment Programme
of the 1980s is a good example of what is entailed.
As Obeng put it, one of the benefits of the ￿involve-
ment of all parties in the decision making process￿
related to the structural adjustment programme of
the 1980s was that ￿as a people, we achieved a sense
of ownership of the economic program, a greater
acceptance of the consequences of the  program, and
a stronger commitment to implement￿.3 The govern-
ments of what became the High-Performing Asian
Economies also enhanced the quality and legitimacy
of their reform and growth programmes by promot-
ing broad-based participation among citizens and
organizations. As Campos and Root (1996: 76) argue
in their book, ￿the East Asian leaders secured the sup-
port of economic elites without compromising sound
policy through mechanisms designed to facilitate
consultation, cooperation, and coordination￿.4
Participation is, perforce, at different levels:
expert, political, and social. The government could
take the initiative to draw up a programme and then
actively mobilize public support and thereby obtain
legitimation of the programme. In the process, it
could modify the initial draft programme, to take
into account the views and concerns of citizens at
large. In this context, governments find useful five
types of tactical moves, namely: (i) accepting, via
consultation and advice, the views of outside experts;
(ii) agreeing to the option of reversing or revising
the programme after experience with partial imple-
mentation; (iii) introducing measures designed to
accommodate distributional concerns; (iv) incorpo-
rating safety net measures as integral elements in
the programme; and (v) ensuring consistency of the
overall policy strategy with national cultural values.
Use of experts from prominent public and pri-
vate interest organizations could prove particularly
useful to a policy reform minded government that
has, nevertheless, lost credibility with the populace
(perhaps because it took too long to come up with a
serious programme of action), or to a regime that
has just taken over the reins of political office. Any
type of regime can invite a group of experts to draw
up a policy reform programme, to assure the citi-
zens of the ￿objectivity￿ and utilitarian nature of such
a programme, and thereby gain the necessary politi-
cal support for implementation. The government
could, alternatively, consult various interest groups
(business, labour, agricultural, university professors,
etc.) and seek their reactions to its draft programme.
In the process, the preferences of these groups be-
come evident, giving the government the opportunity
to come up with a consensus programme that, at the
same time, addresses the underlying problem(s) of
the country.
Major policy reform programmes often get in-
troduced in crises. In such circumstances, the citizens
often find it optimal, in a world of uncertainty, to
grant authority to a government they consider cred-
ible to begin implementation in a way that ensures
that reversal or modification would not be costly (if
the programme turns out to be unpopular). A gov-
ernment may, therefore, as part of its agenda-setting,
give an explicit or implicit commitment that a pro-
gramme it has put forward will be revised if it proves
unpopular during implementation. In this way, the
equilibrium programme is attained via a quasi-
evolutionary process that also abates implementation
costs.
As noted repeatedly in discussions of policy
reform, distributional conflicts could cause delays
in implementing reforms. Typically, where countries
succeed in finding consensus solutions, the pro-
grammes include various devices that address dis-
tributional concerns, in order to secure the support
of various groups. So-called heterodox stabilization
programmes5 employing controls with free-market
policies ￿ for instance, combining major monetary
and fiscal reforms and price controls with exchange
rate as a nominal anchor ￿ could be seen as devices
to balance distributional concerns of various groups,
in the interest of obtaining consensus and limiting
implementation costs. In the same vein, reform pro-
grammes often include ceilings on wage increases,
on taxation of certain groups, on the speed of price
liberalization, and on the adjustment of prices of
parastatal goods and services. The challenge for
policy formulation is to contain any associated
allocative inefficiencies and prevent degeneration of
certain policies into wasteful patronage activities or
populism. For example, taxes and expenditures out-
side the normal budgetary processes (extrabudgetary
funds) designed specifically to favour certain groups
in order to obtain their support could erode a policy
of fiscal restraint and make difficult assessment of
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modities and services, while further opening doors
to corrupt and other diversionary activities.
Safety-net programmes have become major
ways by which governments stave off social unrest
and obtain political support from what could be a
large portion of the population.6 These are poverty
alleviation and income maintenance programmes
targeted to the lowest income groups of the popula-
tion. Temporary public works employment pro-
grammes or demand-based social funds are examples
of safety nets.7
When governments want political support for
major policy reforms, they sometimes need to dem-
onstrate that the reforms conform to or do not violate
fundamental values of the societies; for these values
are among focal points for economic policy. Hence,
if a government becomes unsure about the consist-
ency of its proposed reforms with the values and
ideological focal points of the society, it will prob-
ably need to launch a frontal intellectual attack on
these focal points to convince the citizens of the
country that the focal points are themselves incon-
sistent with achieving a satisfactory (high) level of
economic welfare.
C. Ownership and policy soundness
We have argued that adjustment programmes
need not be designed locally but that for ownership
and hence full implementation they should as a mini-
mum be always legitimated by the populace at large.
We now want to underscore that the programmes
must also be sustainable.
If a programme is going to be supported by
outsiders ￿ in particular by powerful creditors ￿ then
the outsiders must be convinced of the sustainability
of the economic policies before they would give their
support. The country authorities also need to ensure
that, despite their authority and the legitimation of
the programme, developments along the way would
not induce the populace to withdraw its support. To
obtain the support of the outsiders would normally
require that: (i) the policies are well founded in ac-
cepted social scientific theory and international
experience; (ii) there is credible commitment of the
government to the policies; and (iii) there is adequate
capacity of the state and society to implement the
policies. Commitment of the government would be
revealed by appropriate signalling ￿ especially evi-
dence of legitimation and the very content of the
programme itself. Similarly, signals of the willingness
and capacity of the state and society to implement
the programme would include the sequencing of
measures to take due account of state capacity to
implement, a credible state capacity building pro-
gramme, and state-society cooperative frameworks
to prevent policy reversals.
IV. Policy-based conditionality and
its critics
Conditionality could be seen, charitably, as a
set of understandings reached by recipient countries
with their donors/creditors on the conduct of eco-
nomic policy. It emerges from a bargaining process
between donors and recipients,8 with the equilibrium
set of conditions determined by several factors. In
principle, the objective is to arrive at a set of poli-
cies voluntarily agreed by both sides that would
resolve the macroeconomic and/or structural (insti-
tutional and organizational) problems of the country
well enough to raise the per capita income growth
rate much nearer to its potential, lower inflation, and
improve the balance of payments prospects.
A. Role of conditionality
The main objectives of the understandings are
to increase the probability of prompt repayment of
debt and sometimes even to ensure that the funds
(including grants) do not support policies inconsist-
ent with the values of the creditors. In other words,
the creditors/donors typically want the funds to be
used productively, and that the recipient government
is able to collect taxes and the country able to gen-
erate the foreign exchange to facilitate timely re-
payment of any debt assumed.9 In some cases,
creditors/donors may also want to have the country
graduate out of some types of borrowing (or unre-
quited receipts) from them. In principle, then,
conditionality is all about promoting sound policies
that resolutely address the economic problems of the
aid recipient country. As Ahmed et al. (2001) put it
in writing about IMF conditionality: ￿conditionality
provides safeguards to the IMF that the money it
has lent is being used for the intended purpose ￿ to
facilitate the adjustment process ￿ and that the mem-
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rowed from the IMF￿s pool of funds (to which all of
its member countries have contributed)￿. In addi-
tion, the understandings are really also constrained
by obligations of members not to pursue certain poli-
cies except perhaps for temporary emergency pur-
poses ￿ such as exchange policies inimical to
multilateral trade and payments (Johnson, 1977; and
IMFIEO, 2002).
Collier et al. (1997) have distinguished five
objectives of conditionality: inducement, selectiv-
ity, paternalism, restraint and signalling. Inducement,
which is the dominant use of conditionality, is the
offer of financial support in exchange for the coun-
try authorities introducing a certain set of policies.
To Collier et al., the aid donor is buying the policies
and hence really owns them, not the aid-recipient
country. Selectivity is where the maintenance of a
good policy environment is used as a condition for
aid. This means, in the context of Collier et al., that
the conditionality cannot at the same be an induce-
ment since no change in policy is called for. Pater-
nalism is where the aid is conditional on its being
spent on particular goods or services. It is obvious
that this kind of objective is not relevant for macro-
economic or broad structural reform programmes,
which are the arena where the conditionality debate
is most interesting.
A reform-minded government may want to use
conditionality as a restraint, basically hoping that
the reforms would be protected from reversal by
domestic political pressures both during its term of
office and after. This use of conditionality has some
affinity with the role that IMF and World Bank
conditionality supposedly have played in many coun-
try programmes. The two organizations have been
said to be willing to take the blame for unpopular
policies and thereby provide cover for governments.
It seems clear that a government which uses condi-
tionality in this way cannot easily claim ownership
for a programme even if all the policies contained in
the programme are its own, because it refuses to take
full responsibility for the outcome of the programme.
Signalling is when conditionality is used to provide
information to the private sector that the donor has
given its seal of approval to the future policies of
the country authorities. This objective is more popu-
larly expressed in the context of the IMF and the
World Bank as the financial support having a ￿cata-
lytic effect￿ in attracting other financial flows to the
country, especially from the private sector. The cata-
lytic or signalling effect works, of course, only if
the conditionality has a reputation of indeed induc-
ing sound policies by governments.
B. Criticisms of conditionality
According to critics, conditionality as an at-
tempt to buy policy change with financial aid ignores
certain countervailing factors. Most notably, the aid
by alleviating fiscal and payments pressures could
daunt the incentive for policy change. This aggra-
vates a time inconsistency problem, namely, that
once the aid was received unless the government
wanted the reform it could reverse it. In addition,
when a government does not sustain the reform, it
has not been typically punished, for reasons that in-
clude the fact that to cut off the recipient country
from further assistance would aggravate its payments
problem thereby threatening its ability to repay the
very aid donors, where relevant (Collier, 2001).
Some critics see conditionality as very often
essentially coercive. Killick, for instance, states:
￿Conditionality is ... characterized by the use of fi-
nancial leverage to promote donor objectives￿. This
is not meant to insinuate that the policies are neces-
sarily bad for the recipient country, but only to
emphasize that negotiations involving conditionality
are not simply pure ￿policy dialogues￿, and that the
conditions are not typically consensual between
recipient countries and their creditors/donors, particu-
larly where the international financial organizations
are concerned (Killick, 1997; and Killick et al., 1998).
The overarching theme is that as a matter of
empirical fact, the critics argue, policy-based condi-
tionality has not generally achieved its ultimate ob-
jective of ensuring sound policies, because the
programmes with conditionality are not sufficiently
implemented, and this in turn is mainly related to
the fact that the recipient countries do not own the
policies and also do not get punished for failure to
implement policies or for policy reversals. Policies
of recipients change, the argument goes, for reasons
that are exogenous to aid finance. As Killick et al.
(1998: 165) put it,
In the general case, conditionality is not an
effective means of improving economic poli-
cies in recipient countries. The incentive sys-
tem, most notably the absence of a credible
threat of punishment of non-implementation,
is usually inadequate in the face of differences
between donors and governments about ob-
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Bird (1998: 107) argues that implementation
of IMF and World Bank conditionality ￿lies on a
knife edge￿. As he puts it,
There may be some governments that negoti-
ate programs with little intention of carrying
them through. There may be others where, al-
though the intention is to implement the pro-
gram, the effects of the program turn out to
differ from what was expected, with the dif-
ference being either that there are higher net
benefits10 or higher net costs, and in these cir-
cumstances, governments dynamically adjust
their behavior; noncompliance is the result. It
is, therefore, unsurprising that poor implemen-
tation is a common feature of IFI-supported
programs.
Collier (1997) also notes that because using aid
as a means to buy policy reform, via the instrument
of conditionality, has not worked, it has prevented
countries with good policies from separating them-
selves within a set of countries that as a group, such
as the African countries, have low risk-weighted re-
turn rating among investors because of poor policies
on average. In a similar vein, Dollar and Svensson
(2000) argue in general that their results ￿support
the view that the best justification for policy-based
lending is as a commitment technology for sincere
reformers. However, the effectiveness of this tech-
nology is undermined if adjustment loans are given
indiscriminately￿.
According to the critics, the poor relationship
between conditionality and programme implemen-
tation has meant, among other things, that agreeing
a programme supported by the multilateral finan-
cial organizations (notably the IMF and the World
Bank) has not served to raise the credibility of a
country￿s policies in the eyes of potential investors.
In other words, conditionality has not in itself en-
gendered good policies and has had no perceptible
catalytic effect in attracting private capital. If any-
thing, it has had the effect of wasting resources on
poor policy environments.
Rodrik (1996: 190) finds ￿no evidence that
multilateral lending has acted as a catalyst for pri-
vate flows￿. At the same time he finds ￿some
evidence that World Bank lending has focused on
countries with brighter economic futures (once lev-
els of indebtedness are accounted for)￿. This would
seem to indicate that these loans have been assessed
by the private sector, and correctly so, as having lit-
tle or no information content in predicting where it
is most profitable for them to lend and invest among
the low- and middle-income countries of the world.
Claessens (1996: 201) in his comment on Rodrik￿s
paper pointed out, however, that causality tests show
that for many countries foreign direct investment
(FDI) ￿is not related to any other capital flow￿. In-
deed, he asserted that, in general, ￿FDI investors do
not need much signalling, perhaps not even by
multilaterals ...￿. Moreover, the regression results
of Rodrik in his view ￿make clear that the impact of
multilateral lending should be measured not by
subsequent private flows alone, but also by its de-
velopmental impact, including growth, poverty
reduction, and increased domestic confidence (as
reflected in investment, for example)￿ (Classens,
1996: 202).
V. Selectivity
Killick (1997) in line with others (Kahler,
1992), has argued for an approach to aid and adjust-
ment grants and loans that virtually eliminates
hard-core conditionality. Killick et al. (1998: 11)
think of hard-core conditionality as ￿measures that
would not otherwise be undertaken or not within the
time frame desired by the lender, promised involun-
tarily by governments in urgent need of the money
to which the measures are attached￿. The approach,
summarized by Killick, would be founded on four
principles: ownership, selectivity, support, and dia-
logue.
A. Proposals
Selectivity is the most challenging for the do-
nor (lender or grant giver). According to most current
users of the concept, perhaps, it calls for ￿greater
concentration of aid on governments with a demon-
strated commitment to the pursuit of sound policies￿
(Killick et al., 1998: 179). Such a demonstration of
commitment could, for instance, come from prior
action. As Kahler (1992) shows: ￿prior commitment
and policy action (taken before external support is
offered) is a good predictor of successful implemen-
tation￿. Rodrik (1996) also supports concentrating
loans on countries with good policy environments.
Of importance to underscore is that programmes
selected for support would be owned by the coun-
try. Such an approach still would permit aid/loans
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post-chaos) reconstruction and rehabilitation or to
support certain political and economic regime
changes.
On a more general plane, the real challenge is
deciding the extent to which selectivity should be
backward-looking (ex post) and the extent to which
it should be forward-looking (ex ante), the latter
permitting a credible commitment to introduce and
maintain a good policy environment to qualify a
candidate country for selection. Collier (1997), for
example, thinks it essential that selectivity be ex post,
that is, backward-looking. Aid should flow to ￿al-
ready reformed policy environments instead of
attempting to buy reform in bad policy environ-
ments￿. In his view (Collier, 2001: 75), to condition
aid ￿on policy change rather than policy level leads
not only to inefficient allocations between countries,
but also to inefficient allocations over time￿. A demo-
cratically elected government, for instance, that
supposedly has a good policy level but is unwilling
to change policies just before an election may find
its aid finance squeezed at a very inappropriate time.
He states (Collier, 1997: 72),
With ex post selectivity, donors would come
in behind reforms rather than anticipating
them. For the early stages of reforms, perhaps
the first three years, the government would be
reforming without aid, establishing a good
policy environment. Governments which re-
formed in this way would unequivocally es-
tablish with investors that they were reform-
ing because they believed that the reforms
were needed. They would also have to justify
the policy changes to their domestic popu-
lations in terms of their underlying sense rather
than in terms of donor conditions.
Once a country is selected, the ￿support￿ in
terms of financial assistance should be determined
by the financing requirements rather than the policy
reforms stipulated. In short, there should be de-link-
ing of conditionality and finance. Support can also
come in the form of technical assistance, in a form
that enhances self-reliance in recipient countries and
hence fosters ownership. In particular, the technical
assistance would be demand-driven. The experts
should also be independent and the recipient coun-
try free to choose, at it wishes, the supplier of the
technical assistance.
￿Dialogue￿ in Killick￿s framework would also
foster ownership while improving economic policy.
It would basically comprise analytical work and ad-
vice given directly by representatives of the donor,
at the early stages of decisionmaking, for use by the
authorities of the country as it sees fit in its decision-
making. The dialogue would allow the donor to
influence policy without imposing conditionality,
and hence without coercion.
B. Scepticisms
Khan and Sharma (2001: 17) criticize the ex
post selectivity approach, inter alia, because ￿it
would exclude a large number of member countries
not having access to international capital markets
from IMF lending, and this would be fundamentally
inconsistent with the rights of all members to IMF
resources under the Articles of Agreement￿. Unfor-
tunately they discussed only a particular recommen-
dation, which would have, inter alia, IMF financial
support made at penalty rates. Most believers in se-
lectivity do not argue with the current IMF interest
rate policy. Also, as we argue below, selectivity could
be governed by rules that are forward-looking. Thus
access of members need not be adversely affected,
while the incentive to implement sound policies
would, as otherwise a member would not be selected
for financial support.
Khan and Sharma (2001: 17) also argue that
selectivity ￿provides no guarantees against undesir-
able changes in the domestic policy stance (perhaps
through changes in government), and thus may
weaken the safeguards on IMF resources￿. It is dif-
ficult to see how traditional (policy-based) condi-
tionality provides such guarantees after the funds
have been disbursed, and the experience is that it
does not. This is one reason why certain countries
continue to return to the IMF repeatedly to borrow.
They also argue (Khan and Sharma, 2002: 29) that there
￿is also the serious problem of what the IMF should
do when a country￿s policies deteriorate. The dis-
qualification of a country may itself trigger a crisis￿.
This criticism would not apply to forward-looking
selectivity. In addition, once a regime of selectivity
is in place and known to countries, it is bound to
influence their behaviour, and one would tend to see
fewer cases of policies deteriorating, since the Good
Samaritan would no longer exist. Even the Independ-
ent Evaluation Office of the IMF (IMFIEO, 2002)
sees greater selectivity as a tool that could be used
to address the problem of prolonged use of IMF
loans, ￿although this will always involve difficult
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C. A case for ex ante selectivity
We also would support greater selectivity in aid
giving. But we believe that well-designed ex ante
selectivity can be superior to ex post selectivity. First
of all, the thought process used to arrive at ex post
selectivity is ultimately based on a simple but pow-
erful finding: donors are unwilling to punish coun-
tries that do not keep their promise to pursue
(introduce or sustain) policy reform. From that, the
proponents leap onto the next step: a direct solution
￿ encourage donors to punish those who do not keep
their promises ￿ is not possible, because presum-
ably donors will not change their behaviour, for rea-
sons including the incentives of their staff to push
money at recipients. That may be true. But then the
question becomes: why do the proponents of ex post
selectivity believe that they have any chance of con-
vincing donors to adopt that approach? The ques-
tion is extremely hard to answer, especially when
we attempt to do so against the backdrop of the find-
ing that much aid is not being given systematically
to encourage or support policy reform.
In addition, ex post selectivity projects the fu-
ture using only information from the past. This is
unfortunate, especially since the economic policy
environment depends crucially on the political en-
vironment. If a proponent of ex post selectivity finds
out via perfect foresight that soon after a certain aid
is disbursed, a change in the policy environment
would occur, because of political developments, such
a proponent, we believe, would prefer to hold the
aid and wait, unless of course the aid is regarded as
payment for past efforts rather for ￿keeping up the
good work￿.
In our view, ex ante selectivity could be designed
so as to be both forward-looking and backward-
looking. A good predictor of the future cannot ignore
information from the past, so it would incorporate
the information used by ex post selectivity. Given
recipient country ownership, selectivity (ex ante)
would then be guided by a simple rule: the aid (fi-
nancial support) would be given when the donor has
reasonable belief that the funds would be effective
in helping to solve the country￿s economic problems
(including especially poverty alleviation). The ef-
fectiveness of the aid would come from the fact that
the programme of the country contains sound poli-
cies as a package (not item by item) and outcomes,
as assessed by the donor, and the expectation by the
donor that the policies would be implemented, inter
alia, because they have been legitimated by the popu-
lace and the country has appropriate institutional and
organizational capacity to implement them. Techni-
cal assistance would be given if the recipient country
determines that it needs such assistance in specific
areas to enhance its capacity to formulate and im-
plement sound policies and if the country chooses
the donor as the supplier of the technical assistance.
VI. Reforming conditionality: with and
without selectivity
The general consensus is that the number of
conditions attached to loans and grants has become
too large. The IMF has perhaps been under greatest
fire in this regard, particularly with respect to condi-
tionality related to structural factors. The organization
accepts this criticism and has been making effort to
streamline conditionality (see, e.g., Khan and Sharma,
2001; 2002). But simply streamlining is not enough.
To argue in favour of traditional conditionality
is to argue that conditionality improves the prospects
for having sound policies and for ensuring imple-
mentation. There is general agreement that owner-
ship not conditionality is the important element for
effective programme implementation. The issue then
becomes whether without conditionality the sound-
ness of programmes would decline. It is possible to
conclude from the evidence available that macroeco-
nomic and structural adjustment reform programmes
supported by the IMF and the World Bank, with the
usual conditionality, have on the whole been sound;
namely, controlling for certain unforeseen exogenous
shocks, when the programmes have been imple-
mented the policies in the programmes have gener-
ally achieved their objectives, even if with a lag,
and these objectives have been reasonable in light
of the economic situation of the countries (Haque
and Khan, 1998). But in the absence of ownership,
programmes have not typically been implemented.
Policy-based conditionality, also, cannot guaran-
tee timely repayment of loans and hence safeguards
to IMF and World Bank resources; for it cannot guar-
antee the sustainability of sound policies (that is, an
absence of policy reversal) after the funds have been
disbursed. Only country ownership, because of its
appropriate legitimation process, can prevent adverse
domestic political developments and guarantee
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repayment of the debt, country ownership is the es-
sential requirement not conditionality.
Perhaps IMF and World Bank conditionality
could influence the soundness of programmes if it
influences IMF and World Bank effort in country
programme design and implementation. Hence, the
question becomes whether desirable IMF and World
Bank effort (say because of weak capacity of a gov-
ernment and the inability to obtain technical assistance
and advice from other sources) will necessarily be
adversely affected ￿ that is, precluded from being sup-
plied ￿ by the absence of traditional conditionality.
It is easy to see that this need not be so. The quan-
tum of IMF and World Bank effort is not perforce
determined by conditionality; only the nature of the
effort should be so determined. We note that donor
country effort (in preparation and supervision ac-
tivities) does not seem to influence significantly the
success or failure of programmes. For example, in
the case of World Bank loans, Dollar and Svenson
(2000: 4) find no evidence ￿that any of the variables
under the World Bank￿s control affect the probability
of success of an adjustment loan￿. In our framework,
under country ownership, donor￿s effort is not in-
tended to affect success of a loan, but rather to
improve the quality of the policy framework used
by the recipient. The result may be to make certain
the success of the programme as compared to the
counterfactual case of zero donor effort. Donor ef-
fort could be directed, generally, at improving the
quality of the recipient country policy environment.
More narrowly it could focus specifically on assess-
ing, and where relevant helping to improve: (i) the
soundness of the programme chosen; (ii) the capac-
ity of the country to implement the programme; and
(iii) the adequacy of country ownership of the pro-
gramme.
A. Floating tranches
It has been suggested that conditionality could
be made flexible, by employing a device often
dubbed ￿floating tranches￿ (Khan and Sharma, 2001;
2002). The idea is that the lender ￿ say the IMF ￿
would agree with the authorities of the country on
the policy measures but would allow the country
some freedom to decide on the timing of the imple-
mentation of some of the measures; stipulated
tranches of the funds would be accessible only after
the particular policy or policies have been imple-
mented. It is never suggested that the implementation
of all policies would qualify for floating tranche
conditionality, since timely introduction of some
policies could be critical for the rest of the pro-
gramme and since sequencing usually matters in
policy implementation.
B. Outcome-based conditionality
Another suggestion for reforming condition-
ality is to move away from ￿policy-based￿ condition-
ality to ￿outcome-based￿ conditionality (Khan and
Sharma, 2001; 2002). By this is meant that condi-
tionality could focus on certain intermediate and fi-
nal targets and agreement on a time pattern for the
achievement of specific quantitative levels of these
variables. For instance, variables such as inflation,
gross international reserves, or economic growth
could be selected for outcome-based conditionality.
Many outcome variables (related to foreign reserves,
the budget, and credit, for instance) likely to be used
in this approach tend already to feature in condi-
tionality, even when not as performance criteria or
even as structural benchmarks. Outcome variables
such as growth (of gross domestic product) and over-
all balance of payments will not, for many coun-
tries, be available more frequently than on an annual
basis and hence not really usable for conditionality
tied to quarterly or semiannual access to funds bor-
rowed. Still the spirit of the suggestion could be cap-
tured by avoiding certain policy variables such as
exchange rates, tariffs, interest rates, specific com-
modity prices, reserve requirements, and public sec-
tor wages as elements of conditionality.
C. Explicit precommitment
Somewhat along the lines of outcome-based
conditionality, but much more encompassing, is the
suggestion by Bird (1998) to have the international
financial organization ￿require a precommitment to
carry the  program through to completion￿. Failure
to honour this commitment would adversely affect
future access to the organization￿s resources. In other
words, the IMF and the World Bank must become
more willing to punish noncompliance with condi-
tionality than they have demonstrated in the past.
An argument of Kanbur (2000) is relevant here.
Kanbur does not see much of a practical distinction
between ex post and ex ante selectivity, inter alia,
it seems, because one can simply augment the
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get any money before virtually all the conditions
have been met, coupled with being steadfast about
punishing for any policy reversal. This frontloading
is effectively forcing precommitment.
D. Outcome-based conditionality with
selectivity
Collier et al. (1997) favour a redesign of condi-
tionality which select countries to support on the
basis of their policy environment and then conduct-
ing periodic assessment with the achievement of
certain outcomes becoming the condition for con-
tinued financial support. For instance, future finan-
cial support could be made conditional on the
achievement of certain levels of growth, after con-
trolling for influences outside the control of the au-
thorities. Outcome-based conditionality related to
other objectives such as poverty alleviation could
also be designed. In this context, review periods for
assessment may need to be one-year or longer.
Gunning (2001: 136) states, among other points,
that ￿outcomes-based allocation promotes account-
ability by signalling that donors have no involvement
in policy choices, being interested only in results￿.
Gunning, like other proponents, argues that outcome-
based conditionality cum selectivity would also enable
aid to play effectively the signalling and restraint
roles denied it under the current regime of policy-
based traditional conditionality without selectivity.
Namely, aid would provide credible evidence of
sound policy environments and could be used by
recipient governments to resist policy reversals, ￿by
pointing out that such reversals would lead to a loss
of aid￿.
E. Credible evidence of ownership and
implementation capacity
Consistent with our approach in this paper, we
would suggest replacing traditional conditionality
with a different form of conditionality: namely, to
qualify for aid (gift or loan) support, a country￿s rep-
resentatives must provide adequate proof (credible
evidence) to the donor that it (the recipient country)
accepts full responsibility (ownership) for a pro-
gramme considered sound by both sides and that it
has in place appropriate institutional and organiza-
tional capacity to fully implement the programme.
An implication is that in the interest of safeguarding
its resources the lender (for example the IMF or the
World Bank) must approve the country￿s programme
and establish proof of ownership as well as the ex-
istence of adequate implementation capacity. Funds
would be disbursed on the basis of their total contri-
bution to the reform effort of the country, rather than
on the basis of some specific set of policy imple-
mentation schedule.
VII.Operationalizing conditionality
under ex ante selectivity
We have argued for ex ante selectivity. Agree-
ing conditionality in this framework would entail
establishing the reality of ownership, soundness of
the programme (policies and outcomes), and ad-
equate implementation capacity of the authorities.
This, no doubt could be a formidable undertaking.
Lancaster (1999), among others, reminds us that
implementing the now popular calls for selectivity
and recipient country ownership to enhance aid ef-
fectiveness may not be as easy as some would think.
We believe that it is a challenge we must accept.
Boughton (2003), also, in discussing IMF condition-
ality in the context of ownership, says: ￿If ownership
is a necessary condition for successful policy im-
plementation, then it follows that the Fund should
refuse to lend when ownership is lacking￿. He goes
on to note that applying such a rule ￿is far from
straightforward￿, inter alia because ownership is
￿not directly observable￿. Although we agree that
applying the rule would not be easy, we believe that
it is possible to rationally assess the extent to which
ownership exists and to make a reasonably good
judgment as to its adequacy, in any particular con-
text, for implementation of a given policy package.
A. Proof of ownership
The procedure for assessing ownership must
be forward-looking. To conclude that ownership is
real, one must have convincing evidence that effec-
tive ownership prevailed at the initiation of the pro-
gramme and that the probability of policy reversal
due to political changes is very low, either because
such changes are unlikely in the foreseeable future
or because any new political leadership likely to
emerge would continue to implement the pro-
gramme. Hence, the assessors must be armed with a
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democratic and competitive model, etc.) and how
the political institutions of the country work. This
would, inter alia, facilitate a model of the structure
and efficiency of the government as an organization
(civil service bureaucracy, etc.), and permit an over-
all assessment of both the commitment and the ca-
pacity of government officials and employees to
implement the programme. Intra-government rival-
ries and communication would be important ele-
ments in the above analyses and assessments.
The overarching concern is to make sure that,
without coercion, virtually everyone in the country
is committed to the policies in the programme;
namely, that there is national consensus on the poli-
cies. Without such commitment and consensus the
risk of policy reversal cannot be estimated with con-
fidence. The onus must be on the authorities (the
government) to come up with the evidence of com-
mitment and consensus. Knowledge of the system
would enable the assessor to form a rational judg-
ment on the credibility of that evidence.
Some guidelines are possible on the methodol-
ogy of assessing the evidence. Indicators of the
existence of ownership would comprise, as a mini-
mum, a ￿political legitimation indicator￿ (or test)
and an ￿economic model indicator￿ (or test). The
former would consist of convincing evidence that
the programme has evolved out of decisionmaking
processes that, in the past history of the country, have
resulted in effective cooperation, among all major
parties and interest groups, engendering collective
agreement, without coercion, on major policy issues.
Hence the elements in the evidence would depend
on the specific circumstances of a country, includ-
ing the political regime, ethnolinguistic composition,
and consensus building mechanisms. The ￿economic
model indicator￿ would comprise convincing evi-
dence that the programme is consistent with past
(especially recent) economic policies of the coun-
try. Apart from this backward-looking element, this
latter indicator must also have a forward-looking
aspect, which could include public pronouncements
of the current government about its future economic
policies and the institutional and organizational ar-
rangements to implement those policies.
B. Soundness of policies
Ownership is not sufficient for ￿selection￿ for
support. The soundness of the policies would be also
important. We shall say that the policies of the pro-
gramme are sound if as a package they are assessed
as adequate to achieve the objectives and if the ob-
jectives are considered reasonable in light of the
economic circumstances of the country. Basically,
for a macroeconomic programme, the exercise would
involve assessing the reasonableness of objectives
￿ over some period of time (say three to five years)
￿ such as per capita economic growth, balance of
payments, external debt and debt service relative to
GDP, and inflation; the past and prospective policies
that affect these objectives would also be assessed.
This may involve evaluating both macroeconomic and
microeconomic policies, such as interest rate policy
and/or policies to control some monetary variable,
real exchange rate policy, external tariff policy as
well as policies affecting infrastructure, labour mar-
ket and human capital, government efficiency, and
microeconomic policies in important sectors, e.g.,
agriculture. Neglect of the microeconomic policies
would risk not being able to make an informed judg-
ment about the likelihood of the package of policies
being adequate to attain the economic growth ob-
jective, especially since microeconomic, including
so-called sectoral, policies could neutralize the fa-
vourable impact of macroeconomic policies on
particular sectors.
Alternatively, of course, it is possible to take
an approach somewhat similar to the outcome-based
approach to conditionality. This would involve agree-
ing the objectives and then leaving the country the
freedom to decide the means to achieve the objec-
tives, the means being perhaps subject to constraints
due to certain international obligations such as re-
quirements of membership in the IMF or the World
Trade Organization (WTO). In this case, country
teams would not have any obligation to pass judg-
ment on the adequacy of policies, and financial sup-
port would begin only after the country had achieved
certain objectives. Since, in principle, financial sup-
port has positive effects on the targets, the initial
level of the objectives would be set taking into ac-
count the absence of any financial support. Some
countries may find this approach more to their lik-
ing and in our view they should have the opportu-
nity to use it, without compromising the requirement
of ownership.
C. Country implementation capacity
Given ownership and soundness of policy
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mentation capacity. Although implementation capac-
ity has been taken into account in establishing
conditionality associated with IMF financial support,
still, in a few cases, low implementation capacity has
played a role in programme interruptions (Mecagni,
1999). This often means that expected technical as-
sistance to remedy capacity weaknesses did not
materialize in time or was not as effective as pro-
jected. Capacity problems can arise in any area, but
budgetary reforms and privatization have proved
particularly troublesome for a number of countries.
VIII.  Incentive compatibility
We believe that, with the approach outlined in
this paper, adequate incentive compatibility will exist
to foster effectiveness of aid: there will be self-
interest in the recipient countries to implement and
sustain sound policies and there will be self-interest
within the aid-giving organizations to insist on sound
policies and satisfactory outcomes as a condition for
future aid.
A. Donor
The proposals contained in this paper will posi-
tively alter the incentives of country officers in donor
countries and international financial organization to
push funds to countries with weak policy environ-
ments. A country team must, in recommending
financial support of a programme, attest that the pro-
gramme is sound and that it expects the country to
implement the programme. Hence, if the programme
is not implemented, the team cannot simply say that
there was lack of political will on the part of the
government or the political elites of the country. The
country team must explain why, ex ante, it projected
that there would be political will and what factors it
could not have foreseen that came into play during
the actual implementation phase of the programme.
Thus the country team will have self-interest in rec-
ommending financial support only to countries that
have an excellent chance of sustaining a sound policy
environment, given the political environment of the
country. There is no doubt that in predicting future
behaviour of countries, past behaviour will be heav-
ily weighted, perhaps with weights declining the
further away the past date is from the present. The
preceding incentive structure could be strengthened
by instituting explicit guidelines for the performance
evaluation of staff members recommending Board,
department or organization approval for a pro-
gramme that was not implemented, taking due
account of the staff members￿ explanation of why,
contrary to their expectation, the country did not
implement the programme.
B. Recipient
With ownership, the country should have a self-
interest in implementing its programme. Expectation
of future interactions with the creditor/donor is an-
other self-interest factor in implementation of its
programme, as long as this implementation record
affects future behaviour of the creditor/donor towards
it. Selectivity, then, becomes an inducement to in-
troducing and sustaining a sound policy environment.
For appropriate incentive-compatibility of the
recipient, institutional arrangements must therefore
be put in place for the donor/creditor to have a self-
interest in punishing non-implementation of the re-
cipient. The insistence on approval of the country
team and their onus to explain any failure in pre-
dicting implementation is an element of this institu-
tional framework. Even one-off interaction with a
particular creditor/donor will not save the recipient
country from punishment because of reputation:
namely, as long as the behaviour of all potential
creditors/donors is influenced by the reputation of
the recipient in implementing its programmes in the
past. In the case of private creditors, the self-interest
comes from the effect on their profits. For multilat-
eral organizations and bilateral creditors/donors, the
self-interest comes from the effect on their credibil-
ity (in the case of the IMF and the World Bank, for
instance, the effect on the value of their good house-
keeping seal and hence catalytic effect vis-￿-vis pri-
vate markets).
The IMF, for its part, could further strengthen
its incentive regime by a transparent and effective
policy toward continuous use of its resources by
members. It could, for instance, subject a member
to special conditions, including strict prior actions,
if it applies for further assistance (beyond a certain
objectively determined level) before a certain time
period has elapsed since the country￿s last use of
IMF resources (after controlling for the amounts
outstanding in relation to quota, perhaps). If a
country defaults in its repayment obligations, its
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subjected to special conditions before being restored
to good standing. Both the limits to continuous ac-
cess and suspension of membership should be guided
by strict rules that are not easily breached. Any
waiver of those rules for a country should be very
rare, after discussion and approval by a super-
majority of the Board members with the bulk of the
quota holdings.
IX. Conclusion
In this paper, we have been concerned with the
conditions for the elimination of traditional condi-
tionality and the case for doing so in the context of
ensuring country ownership of reform programmes.
We have argued for a different form of conditionality
from the current policy-based conditionality: to
qualify for an aid or loan support, a country￿s repre-
sentatives must provide adequate proof to the donor
that it (the recipient country) accepts full ownership
for a programme considered sound by both sides and
that it has in place appropriate institutional and
organizational capacity to fully implement the pro-
gramme. An implication is that in the interest of
safeguarding its resources the lender (for example,
the IMF or the World Bank) must approve the coun-
try￿s programme and establish proof of ownership
and adequate implementation capacity. A country
team of the international financial organization must,
in recommending financial support of a programme,
attest that the programme is sound and that it ex-
pects the country to implement the programme. But
a recipient country could opt for an alternative ap-
proach in which it agrees targets/objectives with the
lender/aid giver and then have instrument autonomy
to take whatever means it finds appropriate to achieve
those objectives, except for actions proscribed by
its international obligations vis-￿-vis (the IMF or the
WTO). With this alternative, the country will start
receiving funds only after an initial agreed set of
objectives (final or intermediate targets) have been
realized.
Making major changes in conditionality accom-
panying programmes supported by the IMF and the
World Bank would constitute significant institutional
changes in the modus operanda of the world finan-
cial system. Hence, there will and should be sub-
stantial and sophisticated debate on the merits of
taking such a step. The Bretton Woods exchange
system did evolve into something quite different from
its original form devised soon after World War II,
despite fears of many who saw great merits in pre-
serving it in its original form or after making sig-
nificant but not fundamental modifications to it. We
would predict the same for traditional conditionality
of the Bretton Woods Institutions, for reasons oper-
ating both on the demand and supply side of ￿aid￿.
On the demand side, the ￿absence of policy-
based conditionality￿ attached to financial support
will become an intangible asset in world financial
markets. The ability to obtain IMF and World Bank
support without traditional policy-based condition-
ality will prove a powerful signal in world financial
markets. In other words, traditional conditionality
will not survive in an increasingly globalized finan-
cial system. Countries that are willing to own their
programmes and to implement sound policies will
increasingly see an absence of traditional condi-
tionality on IMF and World Bank support as an as-
set in world financial markets ￿ an indication of trust
in their governance ability by the two organizations
￿ and they will demand it as an instrument to sepa-
rate themselves from certain types of high-risk coun-
tries to which financial firms have a prior belief they
belong. In contrast, countries with traditional condi-
tionality attached to their support from the IMF or
the World Bank will see their creditworthiness nega-
tively affected, relatively, in financial markets. This
all comes from the fact that traditional conditionality
is seen by the market as a means to get countries
who would not otherwise do so to pursue sound poli-
cies. The poor record of this approach has damaged
the credibility of that sort of conditionality as a sig-
nal of good policy environments. Thus, recipient
country governments will increasingly demand an
absence of traditional conditionality by demonstrat-
ing an ability to design and implement programmes
that they own and that are appropriately legitimated
in their countries.
On the supply side, we believe that selectivity
will be increasingly preferred by bilateral donors and
by the major shareholders of the multilateral finan-
cial organizations for both fiscal and political
reasons. The fiscal burden of aid and contributions
to multilateral organizations is coming under increas-
ing scrutiny domestically in the industrial countries,
and the end of the Cold War has removed an impor-
tant driving force behind aid without selectivity
focusing on the policy environment. Country own-
ership is essential in making selectivity effective.
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(policy-based) conditionality has no real value in
making aid effective. An approach based on peri-
odic assessment of the policy environment, review
of recent outcomes (of intermediate and final objec-
tives), and understandings on future objectives would
then be preferred to policy-based conditionality, in
determining financial support to low- and middle-
income countries (by bilaterals and multilaterals).
Nelson (1996) has also pointed out that the
objective environment is changing, making conven-
tional conditionality even more difficult to rationalize
and monitor; namely, the weight of market-oriented
institutional reforms is increasing in reform pro-
grammes relative to stabilization and liberalization
reforms. Institutional reforms tend to achieve results
at a slower pace and typically require greater do-
mestic consultation and participation to design and
implement successfully. An obvious conclusion is
that the demand for ownership will be necessarily
stronger in such cases and the periodic assessment
of the policy environment and a focus on outcomes
may be a better approach to monitoring progress than
the specification of precise policy (especially quan-
titative) measures. Thus this factor could affect the
nature of conditionality desired by both demanders
and suppliers of aid. We would note, though, that
while it may be true that the effectiveness of institu-
tional reforms may take longer to assess, it is still
possible to design policy-based conditionality even
for institutional reforms. The one difference is that
the nature and sequencing of the policies need to be
country-specific and the recipient country will typi-
cally have the freedom to select from among best
practices the particular institutional reforms it wants
to implement. This is the approach, for instance, that
the Bretton Woods institutions have been taking in
supporting financial sector reforms in low and middle-
income countries and in the former socialist countries.
The transformation to a world without (tradi-
tional) policy-based conditionality may go through
a period with dual structure, where some pro-
grammes have no traditional conditionality attached
to them while others have such conditionality. But
we do not believe selectivity would lead to undesir-
able distribution of aid resources, except in the initial
stage before the recipient countries have had the
opportunity to adjust to the new reality. Rather,
during the period of dual-structure policy-based
conditionality could be used as a threat, and absence
of such conditionality as a carrot, to encourage coun-
tries not to reverse implementation of sound policies
promised in programmes they own and that are fi-
nancially supported by either of the Bretton Woods
institutions. In that world, as far as the IMF is con-
cerned, it would still be beneficial to have explicit
and transparent rules that are resolutely enforced to:
(i) limit continuous use of IMF resources and (ii) to
punish defaulters in making timely repayment of debt
to the institution.
Notes
1 For general analysis of why countries come to the IMF
see, e.g., Conway (1994) and Bird (1996).
2 See the discussion by Faruquee (1994) of a national de-
bate in Nigeria of a suggested IMF-related adjustment
programme. Unfortunately, that process was not sus-
tained over time.
3 Also of interest here is Tsikata (2003), who compares
ownership issues and experience as they arose in Ghana
and the United Republic of Tanzania.
4 Famous among the ￿mechanisms￿ were deliberation
councils comprising representatives from the private sec-
tor and the public sector. Each council assisted the gov-
ernment in formulating policies ￿that would enhance the
performance of a particular segment of the private sec-
tor (if not the private sector as a whole)￿ (Campos and
Root, 1996: 79).
5 See Bruno (1993) for a discussion and case studies of
such an approach to stabilization.
6 For analysis and case studies, see, e.g., Graham (1994)
and Stewart (1995).
7 See, for example, the discussion of Bolivia￿s Emergency
Social fund by Graham (1994: 54￿82), which she cred-
its for increasing the political sustainability of reform as
well as contributing to poverty reduction.
8 An interesting model of the bargaining process involved,
with specific application to the structural adjustment
loans of the World Bank, is found in Mosley (1987).
9 See the critique by Sachs (1989) of conditionality in the
case of countries experiencing serious debt crisis and
Buira (2003) for a critique of conditionality in the con-
text of programmes by the IMF.
10 The point here, according to Bird (1998: 106) is that if,
for example, the balance of payments situation of the
country improves ￿ say because of improved income
terms of trade ￿ ￿the government has the opportunity to
regain independent control over economic policy, and
disengaging from the IFIs may now enhance the gov-
ernment￿s political prospects￿.
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